Game Theory and Climate Change

Abstract

Climate change perceptions and perceived risk in the United States has become increasingly partisan, with increased belief in and support for climate change and regulation among democrats, but decreased belief and support among republicans. These divergences are partly attributable to increasingly partisan news outlet viewership and coverage. We inhabited a game theory model to recognize optimal climate change communication strategy through news media outlets. Actor strategies included whether to converse with pro- and/or anti-climate change new outlets, and to emphasize regulation, renewable energy, whether climate change is real, man-made, and/or causes harm to the United States Payoffs consisted of change in public opinion for each of the candidate topics actors can chose to emphasize. Solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, games where players make decisions about treaty participation, and games where players make decisions about treaty ratification, are examined. The implications of linking cooperation on climate change with cooperation on other issues, such as trade, are examined. Cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to coalition formation are investigated in order to examine the behavior of coalitions cooperating on climate change. One approach to accomplish assistance is to design a game, known as an apparatus, whose equilibrium corresponds to an optimal outcome.